Labour shortages were endemic in colonial societies. Plantation and mining labour was notoriously unattractive, but the army posed problems of its own. In their search to satisfy the voracious appetite for labour in commercial empires and colonial societies, rulers developed racial and ethnic stereotypes as to which "race" was most suitable to perform certain jobs. Africans were deemed most suitable for hard physical labour in tropical climates. They were also portrayed as "martial races", fit to fill the manpower needs of both Islamic and European armies.
Introduction

African Labour in the Dutch East Indies
While both the Atlantic slave trade and the massive recruitment of indentured labourers from India and China have received ample scholarly attention, much less is known about the experiences of Africans who were brought to Asia, forcibly or voluntarily.
9
This paper explores a largely unknown aspect of inter-colonial labour migration: the use of African labour in the Netherlands East Indies. My own research has focused on the recruitment of African soldiers for the Dutch colonial army in the mid-19 th century.
These 3,080 men from the Gold Coast and its hinterland were no doubt the best documented and possibly the largest group of African immigrants, but they were by no means the first Africans to arrive in the Indonesian archipelago. I will first give a brief survey of the use of African labour in the age of slavery, based on secondary sources.
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My account of the recruitment of African soldiers in the age of indentured labour is based on my own research in the Dutch archives as well as interviews.
Although Java was much more densely populated than the Cape of Good Hope, the VOC nevertheless needed to import slaves to meet its labour needs. Slave imports into Batavia alone reached about 1,000 annually in the 17 th century and rose to about 3,000
per year in the 1770s. 10 Most came from other Indonesian Islands, from the Malabar and Coromandel Coast, or from elsewhere in Asia. Slavery was an indigenous institution in the archipelago, and the use of slaves as soldiers was common practice. For its slave battalions, the VOC recruited initially from Bali and Makassar and later from Bengal and Madagascar. 11 Even after the age of company rule, the East Indies army used involuntary labour on a massive scale. Governor Daendels (1808-1811) recruited from former company slaves and bought slaves from Dutch residents, as well as imposing a levy on local Javanese rulers, who were obliged to deliver one soldier per 1,000
inhabitants. 12 In the course of the 19 th century, the East Indies army came to rely heavily on convict labour for porter duties and other physically demanding work. When the Dutch abolished slavery in the East Indies in 1859, forced labour already exceeded slave labour. During the last quarter of the 19 th century, the use of forced labour by the East Indies army showed a marked increase. 13 In the colonial context in the 19 th century, various forms of unfree labour were the rule rather than the exception.
For the 17 th century, we have several instances where reference is made to importing labour from Africa to the Indonesian archipelago. Already in 1615, Governor-General Gerard Reynst remarked on the superiority of slaves over Dutch labourers: "I have already discovered that one slave accomplishes more work than two or more of our own people could do". 14 In 1626, the VOC for the first time sent a vessel to Madagascar to In 1671, the VOC started mining gold at Sillida (now Painan, near Padang) in Sumatra.
Initially European workers were used but, due to the harsh conditions and malaria, mortality was extremely high. Batavia desperately required forced labour. Bengal slaves were no longer available. Men from New Guinea, Borneo, Nias or Bali were thought too weak for this hard labour. Malabar was short of slaves, and these were also believed to be too weak for the goldmines. Madagascar remained the only option. Slaves from
Madagascar were "strong, robust and rudely built" ("grof van leedenen") and could be used for heavy work. From the early 18th century, they were also brought to Ceylon 
Conquest, Control and Coercion
The most intriguing occupation mentioned for African slaves in the 18 th century is the duty of assistants to the bailiff. In every colonial empire, the jobs of conquest, control and coercion posed particular problems. These duties were often performed by outsiders, men who would not be tempted to make common cause with the colonial subjects and who inspired fear in the local population. For service in India, Negroes seem the very thing; they are sure not to fraternise with the natives. By and by, unless we first lose our Colonial Empire, we shall practically recognise the wisdom of the Romans, who garrisoned each province with troops from a distance.
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This particular proposal was not implemented, but the same logic underpinned the recruitment strategies of many colonial and imperial armies. Ellis' argument was quoted in the Dutch colonial press in support of a plea for the recruitment of Africans for the Dutch East Indies army.
The recommendations made by Major Charles Hamilton Smith, who had served 12 years with the British West India regiments, were also influential. Hamilton Smith (born as Karel de Smet, near Antwerp) was a personal acquaintance of the Dutch royal family who held him in high esteem because of his services to the Dutch army in the 1815 campaign against Napoleon. Hamilton Smith praised the strength, discipline, courage and endurance of African troops and emphasised the crucial importance of equal treatment of black and white troops. Provided that they were treated properly and humanely, African troops would serve loyally. Hamilton Smith saw no danger whatsoever of fraternisation between Africans and Asians, as he believed that Asians regarded Africans as cannibals. He thought it advisable to send also a number of black women in order to establish small African communities around Batavia, which would serve to reproduce new manpower for the army. He noted that half rations of rum would be sufficient but that it was absolutely vital to allow them to dance at night, "because all of Africa dances at night". 28 Hamilton Smith believed that volunteers could be found among free blacks and slaves in Surinam and the Dutch West Indies, but these colonies were already suffering an acute shortage of manpower due to the abolition of the slave trade. After further exploration, the Dutch government turned to its almost forgotten possessions on the coast of Guinea, whose commercial activity had all but halted since the abolition of the slave trade.
26 R.N. Buckley (1979) African recruitment would be expanded to some 2,000 men. Last was under strict instructions to enlist volunteers only, without resorting to coercion. In the East Indies, the African soldiers would be paid and treated on an equal basis with European troops.
After the expiry of their 6-year contract, they had a choice between re-enlistment, repatriation to Elmina or settling on Java. In 1831 and 1832, three ships were sent from the Netherlands to Elmina to transport the 150 African troops to Batavia but, in spite of sustained efforts, Last had managed to recruit only 44 men. Some had previously served with the Dutch in the small Elmina garrison, but most were debtors or pawns in debt arrangements who wanted the money to pay off their debts. Some were slaves, who transferred part of their pay to their masters in Elmina or other coastal towns. Some were free men who delegated part of their pay to their parents or other relatives.
Although The Hague had expressed a preference for "pure" and unspoilt Africans, this first detachment of 44 men included a number of mulattos who had been handpicked as interpreters, because they knew some basic Dutch.
The small number of men rendered the cost of this experiment excessive. Reports about their military qualities, however, were quite favourable. The first campaigns to include African soldiers were the expeditions to Lampong (Southern Sumatra) and Jambi 
Mission to Kumasi
Meanwhile, African recruitment on the Guinea Coast had resumed on a much more ambitious scale. In 1836, King Willem I sent Major-General Jan Verveer as envoy to the Ashanti court. So far recruitment along the Coast had yielded only a trickle of volunteers, causing Governor Lans to resort to buying slaves and enlisting them for periods of up to 20 years. Since these slaves had not been manumitted, this type of recruitment amounted to a violation of the international treaties banning the slave trade.
On his arrival in Elmina, Verveer immediately ended this practice. Lans, now living in retirement in the Netherlands, was severely censored and his recruits were retroactively manumitted. The British, who policed the ban on the transatlantic slave trade, had strongly objected to Lans' recruitment methods, but initially raised no objections against Verveers' scheme, once he had ensured that only free men or manumitted slaves would be enrolled.
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In the new, expanded recruitment scheme the focus was on the Kingdom of Ashanti, an old ally of Elmina and the Dutch. In the past, Ashanti had been a major supplier of slaves. The Dutch believed that Ashanti still commanded a surplus of manpower, some which surely could be made available to the Dutch colonial army. After long delays and the exchange of lavish gifts, the contract between King Willem I of the Netherlands and Kwaku Dua I of Ashanti was duly signed in the Ashanti capital Kumasi on 18 March 1837. The contract stipulated that the Ashanti king would deliver 1,000 able-bodied men within a year, in exchange for 6,000 guns with powder. In addition, Verveer was inconceivable that the home-bound trip could be extended into the area of presentday Burkina Faso or Northern Nigeria. Although this was never clearly spelt out, these men were considered lifetime soldiers. In 1844, the indeterminate period of service was converted to 15 years.
After expiry of their contracts, the soldiers could opt for re-enlistment, repatriation to Elmina or permanent residence on Java. In the first phase of African recruitment, most chose to return to their native lands. Men from the coastal areas usually returned to their former place of residence, while those from northern regions generally opted to settle in Elmina, where the pensions were paid out. Veterans were allocated plots of land on a hill just behind the Castle of St. George. From the 1840s, this hill became known as Java Hill. Although the name is still in use today, very few present-day inhabitants are familiar with the historical background of Java Hill. I have been able to locate only one descendant of returned KNIL veterans on Java Hill.
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As the numbers of Africans in the East Indies increased, veterans increasingly decided to settle with their Indo-African families in the garrison towns on Java, often maintaining close contact with fellow Africans. Particularly for ex-slaves, settlement on Java could be the more attractive option. On the Gold Coast, they would be regarded as former slaves, while on Java they were entitled to European status. Soldiers had a very lowly position in colonial society but, on the other hand, Europeans were considered superior to the native population. Most African soldiers, however, never faced this choice: they died during their long periods of army service. Few actually died on the battlefield. Like Europeans, most Africans succumbed to disease.
On the invitation of King Willem I, the Ashanti king entrusted his young son and his nephew to Verveer, to be taken to the Netherlands for a European education. The nephew, Kwamena Poku, later returned to Elmina as an army corporal. His intention had been to return to Kumasi, but he had become alienated from the land of his birth.
No longer able to speak his native Twi, he wasted away in Elmina and ultimately 32 The one exception is the Witts family, descendants of soldier Jan Wit, who returned to Elmina in 1880 after 12 years of army service. He left his son Melchior behind on Java. Jan Wit began a new family life in Elmina, while young Melchior joined the Dutch army. The descendants of Melchior Wit now live in the Netherlands. I did meet other Ghanaian descendants of KNIL soldiers, notably the descendants of corporal Manus Ulzen, who was among the first volunteers to enlist in 1832. The Ulzen family, however, was no longer living in Elmina, although they maintained strong bonds with their place of origin. The Ashanti had a great reputation as a warrior nation and Verveer had initially hoped to enlist them for the Dutch army, but it soon became apparent that this was out of the question. In practice, the troops recruited in Kumasi were slaves captured by the Ashanti in war, rendered as tribute or bought at slave markets such as Salaga. They came from north of Ashanti, perhaps even as far as the bend of the Niger River. They were generically known as Donkos. Enlisting free Africans as volunteers proved a pipe dream. In order to reconcile the recruitment effort with the obligations of the treaties banning the slave trade, the recruits were issued with an Act of Manumission. They purchased their freedom with an advance on their army pay of about 100 guilders, to be repaid over the years by deducing 8.5 cents a day from their pay. Verveer reckoned that the soldiers would be able to pay off their debts in two years, after which they would enjoy equal status in every respect with the European soldiers.
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The first batch of African soldiers was registered using their own names transcribed into Dutch. With increasing numbers, this became a source of confusion since men were often named after their day of birth and so many of the names were the same. Moreover, Dutch officers found it difficult to pronounce and remember African names. Verveer therefore decided that the recruits from the interior should be given Dutch names, preferably of a short monosyllabic kind. 35 In daily roll-calls on the troop ships, the by Verveer required that all recruits be asked explicitly and individually whether they voluntarily accepted to enlist. In quite a few cases, the Dutch governor concluded that the men had been brought against their own will. They were sent away or returned to their owner. 37 As long as the proper procedures were adhered to, the recruits did have a certain choice in the matter, even though the choice was limited to remaining a slave or becoming soldier. Not content with this limited choice, quite a few recruits attempted desertion, but this was rarely successful. Some governors were undoubtedly more lax than others, but judging from the Elmina journals after 1837, it was fairly routine procedure to inquire whether the recruits consented, although this probably could not have applied to the recruits sent from Kumasi. Substantial numbers of men were turned back because of physical or mental deficiencies or advanced age. Some begged not to be sent back to Kumasi, fearing dire consequences.
In 1840, a shipment of 50 recruits destined for Surinam to supplement the Corps Colonial Guides caused alarm in London. As this transport followed the traditional route of the slave trade, it was much more sensitive than the recruitment for the East Indies. The British foreign minister, Lord Palmerston, wrote to The Hague, objecting to this "pure and simple act of slave trading". 38 In 1841, King Willem I decided to end recruitment in Africa, but this was more in response to panicky army reports from the East Indies in the wake of a series of African mutinies than in reaction to British protests. African recruitment was reopened in 1855, but on a more modest scale. In discussing whether this recruitment effort indeed amounted to covert slave trading, the American historian, Larry Yarak, concludes that the practice in effect fits 19 th century patterns of indentured labour. The African soldiers served a contract of limited duration, after which they were free to settle on Java or return to the Gold Coast. Indeed hundreds of veterans did return to Elmina, often with pensions. The issue of whether the Africans actually enlisted voluntarily is more complicated, but the available evidence indicates that in most cases they had a certain say in the matter. However, the situation on the Gold Coast was a far cry from the prevailing images in the Netherlands. Dutch policy makers believed that Africans lived in abject poverty, suffering the oppressive rule of brutal tyrants. Therefore, they would be only too happy to enlist as soldiers in the service of a benign and enlightened government. This proved a serious miscalculation:
free Africans saw no reason to leave the land of their birth, only slaves could conceivably consider this option as a way of obtaining their manumission.
Rather than a revival of the export slave trade, Yarak concludes, this recruitment effort for the Dutch East Indies army should be seen as "a distinctly 'modern' form of labour recruitment in which a far greater number of men willingly participated than has previously been thought". 39 In some respects, the African soldiers in Java were better off than Asian indentured labour in the Western hemisphere. In terms of mortality on board ship, an important criterion in distinguishing the transport of indentured workers from the transatlantic slave trade, the African soldiers compare very favourably.
Mortality among Indian migrants to the West Indies between 1851 and 1870 was 6.5%, and among British migrants for New York it was around 1% in the period 1836-1853.
40
In comparison, mortality among African recruits during the three-month voyage from Elmina to Batavia was around 0.84%. 41 In other respects, the fate of the African soldiers was harsher: their period of service was much longer than in the case of most indentured workers, and mortality on the job was higher. Unlike indentured workers, the African 
Military Merits
Since African recruitment had been launched as an experiment, the KNIL had issued instructions that detailed reports be made on both positive and negative experiences with this new source of manpower. Initial army reports on the performance of the Africans were largely favourable, in spite of the numerous communication problems that made their training both difficult and time-consuming. The Africans spoke a variety of African languages, which were often not mutually intelligible. They understood neither Dutch nor Malay, the languages of instruction in the army. A few Eurafricans and Africans could act as interpreters between Dutch and Fanti or Twi (the languages spoken on the Gold Coast and in Ashanti), but there were never sufficient interpreters to serve in all the African companies. Because of the language problem, the Africans were not yet fully subjected to the army's code of discipline. The KNIL command issued instructions for lenient treatment, and therefore their misdemeanours were rarely punished.
According to their commanding officers, the main vice of the Africans was laziness, resulting in uncleanliness. They took better care of their weapons than of their uniforms.
The Africans kept their distance from both Europeans and native Indonesians. It was emphasised that they looked down on the native population. The officers remarked that they were very distrustful, always worrying about being cheated. The nature of the Africans was described as "hot-tempered, irascible and often very insolent". Another officer remarked that they were "of a rough nature, jealous, distrustful and greedy". On the other hand, they were honest men. No instances of thievery had been reported. The Africans were strong, muscled, indefatigable and very well adapted to the tropical climate. In battle, they demonstrated bravery and fearlessness, even more so than the Europeans. In combat, their ardour needed to tempered, otherwise they ignored the orders of their officers. Some reports complain about substantial drinking, but alcoholic excesses were less serious than among the European soldiers. A few reports indicate that some of the Africans suffered from homesickness or had other problems adapting to their new lives. Some were repatriated to Elmina as unsuitable for army service. In July 1838, ten Africans armed with bayonets left the barracks in Surabaya "under the pretext of wanting to return to their native lands". They became involved in a fight with the local population, who were usually eager to apprehend deserters as they were given a reward for every man delivered at the army barracks. When they were returned to the garrison, five of the deserters were injured.
44
Mutinies 45
By and large however, the Africans seem to have adjusted well to their new role, jealously guarding their status as European soldiers. Most discontent was related to 43 NA, MK I, Openbare Verbalen, inv. no 1219, exh. 25 March 1839, no. 16, the Commander-in-chief of the KNIL, General Cochius, to the Governor-General. Also: MK II, Generaal Overzigt, Verslag over bij het leger dienende Afrikanen, 3 sept 1838 no. 3 geheim; Gedenkschrift Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (1990: 65) . 44 NA, MK I, inv. no. 4551, exh. 10 Dec. 1841 no. 527 geheim, Acting Governor Merkus to Dept. of Colonies. 45 For a more detailed account of the mutinies, see I. van Kessel (2003) Subsequently the measure was extended to the African soldiers, as "they were known to be of an uncleanly nature, to have a greasy skin, greasy hair and a peculiarly strong and unpleasant smell". 47 Coming on top of accumulating grievances about unequal treatment, the issue of the mattresses became the final straw. Other grievances were related to their longer term of service and lower pay, as a result of the deduction of 8.5
cents to repay the costs of manumission. These deductions had become a permanent feature, continuing long after the due amount of about 100 guilders had been repaid.
This meant that the Africans were no longer paying off a debt, but that they received structurally lower pay than the Europeans.
In mid-1838, a mutiny erupted among the Africans of the 1 st Infantry Battalion at Padang Riboe Riboe, on Sumatra. The mutineers were brought before a military tribunal but the case remained inconclusive because of language problems. Africans who could have served as interpreters were suspect as accomplices to the mutiny. As Acting Governor Merkus later related, this had made it impossible to impose an exemplary punishment, which he had deemed necessary "to reign in the spirit of insubordination disobeyed their officers and returned to their barracks to seize the firearms. The 4 th company had already armed itself. However, as the commander had been warned about the nocturnal oath, he had taken precautions. European troops had already occupied the barracks to prevent the Africans from taking the guns. The three European companies dispersed the mutineers, after which armed patrols were sent out in pursuit. They apprehended 85 fugitives, while three men managed to escape. By this point in time, December 1841, the army counted 1,318 Africans. After the initial panic had calmed down, the KNIL command believed that the problem of the "haughty"
Africans would solve itself, as they would gradually be phased out from the army. 
The Aceh War 1873-1913
In 1874, two African companies (230 men in total) took part in the second expedition to Aceh. The previous year the first expedition had ended in dismal failure. Mortality during the first phase of the second expedition was very high, largely due to cholera, dysentery and other diseases. The Africans had not been spared. 57 H.L. Zwitser & C.A. Heshusius (1977 ) Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch leger 1830 -1950 , Den Haag: 25. 58 P. van 't Veer (1980 Encyclopeadie van Nederlandsch Oost Indië (1917-21) , 's Gravenhage: Vol. I: 13-14.
60 Indische Gids (1886: 611-617) . In the accounts of Indo-African descendants now living in the Netherlands, it is stressed that relations with Indonesian neighbours were generally good. After all, the African grandfathers had lived with Indonesian wives. But in most accounts, the social distance is obvious. As the children went to European schools, their school friends were largely Dutch, Indo-European and fellow Indo-Africans. Most Indo-African families employed one or more Javanese domestic servants. In the socio-cultural hierarchy of the Dutch East Indies, the Indo-Africans were closest to the Indo-Europeans. In due time, they assimilated with the lower echelons of colonial society, although an unknown and undocumented number must have merged with Indonesian society.
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In World War II, the second, third and fourth generation Indo-Africans fought in the Dutch army against Japan and shared the fate of the prisoners of war in the notorious camps in Burma. In the Indonesian war of independence (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) , the Indo-Africans encountered the same hostility as the Dutch. The vast majority had never entertained any doubts about the legitimacy of colonial rule and felt no sympathy whatsoever for the nationalist cause. While the Indo-African men served in the Dutch army in the war against Indonesian nationalists, their wives and children were evacuated from Republik-63 E. Kusruri (1979) held territories to Jakarta and Yogyakarta. After the Dutch finally recognised Indonesian independence in 1949, most Indo-Africans opted for "repatriation" to the Netherlands, in many cases citing that they were "born Dutch" or had "Dutch blood". 
Conclusions: Free and Unfree Labour
Nature or Nurture : Martial Races and European Civilisation
The discussions among Dutch government and army officials serve as an interesting illustration of a 19 th century debate on "Nature or Nurture". While some considered Africans a "martial race", others argued that intensive training and guidance by European officers was essential to mould them into useful soldiers. Most labour needs in the East Indies were met by indentured labour from China, but the Chinese were seen as coolies, not as potential soldiers. In the search for "martial races", many colonial armies went for the physically imposing Africans. Africans were depicted as the stereotypical warrior race, at least as long as they were "pure Africans", who had not yet been spoilt by European civilisation. The Dutch preferred the Ashanti from the interior to the coastal Fanti who supposedly had assimilated all the vices of the whites along the coast, notably drunkenness and idleness. The "children of nature" from the interior were reputed for their strength, endurance, loyalty and their resistance to tropical diseases.
Availability, however, was a crucial factor: when it turned out that Ashanti recruits were not available, the "Donkos" were advertised as the eminent warrior tribe. This is somewhat incongruous, as "Donko" was a generic term for the ethnicities north of Ashanti, where the Ashanti collected their slaves as tribute or war booty. While the European influence on the West African coast was considered harmful, the exposure of the African recruits to Dutch influence in the East Indies presumably served a civilising mission. One Dutch official in The Hague advocated the formation of a separate African corps, in order to protect the Africans from the depravities characteristic of European troops in the tropics, but army command in Batavia rejected this idea as impractical and a security risk.
65 Paradoxically, the instruction of coastal Africans who were used to Europeans was much easier than training the supposedly unspoilt "children of nature".
Over the period of African recruitment, the stereotypical image shifted from brave and loyal soldiers to mutinous rabble, unfit for battle. In retrospect, the image of loyal and courageous troops prevailed, but it was linked to the civilising mission supposedly 
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